עד כמה שזכור לי, הוא מדבר על טריקים ברמת הנהלת חשבונות להעלת מחירי מניות. לא על מוצרים
אתה מנסה להסיט את הדיון. ציטוט מדויק שלך: "ליצרנים לא היו בעלי מניות על הראש (חברות לא היו רצות אוטומטית להנפקה בבורסה)".
להלן אביא ציטוט אחד של גראהם שלדעתי הוא חד דיו כדי להעביר את הנקודה ש:
1. גם גראהם התעסק ביכולת של הגופים המנהלים
2. עצם העובדה שגראהם מדבר על הניהול כ"כ הרבה ושגראהם נחשב לאחד המשקיעים הגדולים בהיסטוריה מראה ש"היו להנהלה בעלי מניות על הראש".
לאחר מכן אביא ציטוט שבו גראהם מזהיר מפני זה שחלק המגופים המנהלים עושים מניפולציות לתוצאות הפיננסיות שלהם - זה דבר שנעשה רק אם "יש בעלי מניות על הראש".
לבסוף אביא עוד מגוון ציטוטים שמצאתי המתקשרים להנהלה, חובתיה, יחסיה למשקיעים ומניפולציות שלה.
כל הציטוטים מהספר "ניתוח ני"ע" שיצא לראשונה לאור ב-39(אוכל לספק מיקומים מדוייקים לבקשה):
Graham, Benjamin; Dodd, David (2008-09-25). Security Analysis: Sixth Edition, Foreword by Warren Buffett (Security Analysis Prior Editions) . McGraw-Hill Education. Kindle Edition.
1. ציטוט לגבי התקפות על גופים מנהלים:
"It is an unhappy fact that in many cases where a management’s policies are attacked the critic has some personal axe to grind. This too is perhaps inevitable. There is very little altruism in finance. Wars against corporate managements take time, energy and money. It is hardly to be expected that individuals will expend all these merely to see the right thing done. In such matters the most impressive and creditable moves are those made by a group of substantial stockholders, having an important stake of their own to protect and impelled thereby to act in the interests of the shareholders generally. Representations from such a source, in any matter where the interest of the officers and the owners may conceivably be opposed, should gain a more respectful hearing from the rank and file of stockholders than has hitherto been accorded them in most cases.
Broadcast criticisms initiated by stockholders, proxy battles, and various kinds of legal proceedings are exceedingly vexatious to managements, and in many cases they are unwisely or improperly motivated. Yet these should be regarded as one of the drawbacks of being a corporate official and as part of the price of a vigilant stock ownership. The public must learn to judge such controversies on their merits, as developed by statements of fact and by reasoned argument. It must not allow itself to be swayed by mere accusation or by irrelevant personalities."
Graham, Benjamin; Dodd, David (2008-09-25). Security Analysis: Sixth Edition, Foreword by Warren Buffett (Security Analysis Prior Editions) (Kindle Locations 11703-11713). McGraw-Hill Education. Kindle Edition.
2. ציטוט לגבי מניפולציות של ההנהלה:
"The basing of common-stock values on reported per-share earnings has made it
much easier for managements to exercise an arbitrary and unwholesome control over the price level of their shares. Whereas it should be emphasized that the overwhelming majority of managements are honest, it must be emphasized also that loose or “purposive” accounting is a highly contagious disease."
3. ציטוטים נוספים:
1) "Earnings Not Only Fluctuate but Are Subject to Arbitrary Determination - But these earnings per share, on which the entire edifice of value has come to be built, are not only highly fluctuating but are subject also in extraordinary degree to arbitrary determination and manipulation. It will be illuminating if we summarize at this point the various devices, legitimate and otherwise, by which the per-share earnings may at the choice of those in control be made to appear either larger or smaller."
2) "Now, investors scrutinize companies’ dividend policies as a window into management’s thinking about the durability of the free cash flow."
3) "Stockholders are entitled to receive the earnings on their capital except to the extent they decide to reinvest them in the business. The management should retain or reinvest earnings only with the specific approval of the stockholders. Such “earnings” as must be retained to protect the company’s position are not true earnings at all. They should not be reported as profits but should be deducted in the income statement as necessary reserves, with an adequate explanation thereof."
4) "The danger here is that management may be tempted to manipulate the dividend to create an inappropriately favorable picture of future cash flow."
5) "On comparatively rare occasions, managements resort to padding their income account by including items in earnings that have no real existence."
6) "This device of concealing a subsidiary’s profits in good years and drawing upon them in bad ones may seem quite praise-worthy as a method of stabilizing the reported earning power. But such benevolent deceptions are frowned upon by enlightened opinion, as illustrated by the more recent regulations of the New York Stock Exchange which insist upon full disclosure of subsidiaries’ earnings.
It is the duty of management to disclose the truth and the whole truth about the results of each period; it is the function of the stockholders to deduce the “normal earning power” of their company by averaging out the earnings of prosperity and depression. Manipulation of the reported earnings by the management even for the desirable purpose of maintaining them on an even keel is objectionable none the less because it may too readily lead to manipulation for more sinister reasons."
7) "But in many cases also the fact that an issue sells below liquidating value is a signal that mistaken policies are being followed and that therefore the
management should take corrective action— if not voluntarily, then under pressure from the stockholders."
8) "Hamilton Woolen Company, another example in the textile field, is a case of individual rather than of general improvement. For several years prior to 1928 the company had operated at substantial losses, which amounted to nearly $ 20 and $ 12 per share in 1926 and 1927, respectively. Late in 1927 the common stock sold at $ 13 per share, although the company had net current assets of $ 38.50 per share at that time.
In 1928 and 1929 changes in management and in managerial policies were made, new lines of product and direct sales methods were introduced, and certain phases of production were reorganized."
9) "But the rate has been variable, and the average stockholder feels that he is at the mercy of the management’s decisions. (This is not entirely so in fact, since the penalty clauses in the Revenue Act virtually compel disbursement of the net income realized by investment trusts.)"
10) "It is a notorious fact, however, that the typical American stockholder is the most docile and apathetic animal in captivity. He does what the board of directors tell him to do and rarely thinks of asserting his individual rights as owner of the business and employer of its paid officers. The result is that the effective control of many, perhaps most, large American corporations is exercised not by those who together own a majority of the stock but by a small group known as “the management.”"
11) "Plausible but Partly Fallacious Assumptions by Stockholders. Alert stockholders— if there are any such— are not likely to agree fully with the conclusion of Messrs. Berle and Means that they definitely have “surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest.” After all, the American stockholder has abdicated not intentionally but by default. He can reassert the rights of control that inhere in ownership. Quite probably he would do so if he were properly informed and guided. In good part his docility and seeming apathy are results of certain traditional but unsound viewpoints which he seems to absorb by inheritance or by contagion. These cherished notions include the following:"
12) "Interests of Stockholders and Officers Conflict at Certain Points. But a second reason for not always accepting implicitly the decisions of the management is that on certain points the interests of the officers and the stockholders may be in conflict."